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Introduction 
The ability of claimants to bring proceedings before a court to allege a violation of the 
constitution by a public authority, and obtain a remedy should a violation be found, is a key 
aspect of the effectiveness of that state‟s constitutional law. The United Kingdom‟s Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA), which gives further effect in domestic law to the majority of the 
Convention rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) , places a 
limit on who is able to bring a legal claim alleging that there has been a breach of their 
Convention rights by a public authority. Known as the “victim test”, this limit is contained in s.7 
of the HRA which provides that only the victim of an unlawful act may bring proceedings and 
further, that a person can be a victim only if he or she would also be considered to be a victim for 
the purposes of Art.34 of the Convention if proceedings were brought before the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
In common with many other features of the HRA, this test was directly transplanted from the 
international context, to the national and was and remains different to the most closely 
comparable “indigenous” standing test which is the sufficient interest test. This is the test which 
must be satisfied by a claimant in order to bring an application for judicial review. Pursuant to 
s.31(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the High Court shall not grant leave to make an 
application for judicial review unless it considers that “the applicant has a sufficient interest in 
the matter to which the application relates.” Over the past ten years, there has been a significant 
liberalisation of this test as a result of judicial interpretation. However the s.7 victim test remains 
static, the subject of little judicial or academic discussion, and not an aspect of the HRA where 
potential claimants have attempted to push the boundaries. Whilst transplantation of the victim 
test has had some advantages for the legal protection of human rights at the domestic level, the 
problems inherent in a direct transplant from the international to the national context are also 
evident.  
The victim test in practice 
There has been very little judicial consideration of the section 7 test. In the few cases where it 
has been considered, it has been held that the HRA “was intended to provide a domestic remedy 
where a remedy would have been available in Strasbourg. Conversely, the Act was not intended 
to provide a domestic remedy where a remedy would not have been available in Strasbourg.”1 In 
short, “the definition of „victim‟ in s.7(7) turns on whether proceedings could be brought in the 
Strasbourg court in respect of the act complained of.”2 In accordance with Strasbourg authority, 
it has been held that the actio popularis does not apply to applications under the Convention. 
“There is no scope for proceedings to be brought by a person who has not himself been affected 
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 Al-Skeini v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 at [58] per Lord Rodger. See also Aston Cantlow and 
Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v Wallbank [2004] 1 AC 546. 
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 Eastaway v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] EWCA Civ 425 at [54] per Arden LJ. 
by the alleged violation”.3 In the only reported case on this point, Director General of Fair 
Trading
4
 it was confirmed that trade unions, or other representative bodies which have an 
interest on behalf of their members in general or are otherwise interested in the point at issue in 
the case but are not themselves directly affected are not “victims” within the meaning of section 
7. There is now one exception to this. The Equality and Human Rights Commission, which 
commenced its work on 1 October 2007, is the only organisation in the UK to have been granted 
an exemption from s.7 of the HRA. S.30(1) of the Equality Act 2006 provides that the 
Commission shall have capacity to institute or intervene in legal proceedings, whether for 
judicial review or otherwise, if it appears to the Commission that the proceedings are relevant to 
a matter in connection with which the Commission has a function. S.30(3) provides that the 
Commission may, in the course of legal proceedings for judicial review which it institutes, or in 
which it intervenes, rely on s.7(1)(b) of the HRA (rely on the Convention right or rights 
concerned in any legal proceedings) and, for that purpose, “the Commission need not be a victim 
or potential victim of the unlawful act to which the proceedings relate”.5 But it may act “only if 
there is or would be one or more victims of the unlawful act”.6 No award of damages may be 
made to the Commission.
7
 To date the Commission has not brought a 
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It has also been held that s.7 must be given a generous interpretation as befits its human rights 
purpose.
8
 In accordance with Strasbourg authority, both indirect victims and potential victims 
have been recognised as victims by the domestic courts, although, as is later explained, neither 
category has yet reached the limits set by the ECtHR. 
The advantages of a “constitutional transplant” 
Although the United Kingdom ratified the ECHR in 1953, and accepted the jurisdiction of the 
European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and the European Commission of Human Rights, 
until this date domestic courts had fairly limited powers in relation to the ECHR. The HRA was 
designed to remedy this deficiency, its purpose “to make more directly accessible the rights 
which the British people already enjoy under the Convention” in short to “bring those rights 
home.”9 On 2 October 2000, the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) came fully into force in the 
United Kingdom empowering domestic courts to determine whether or not the activities of 
public authorities were compatible with the particular Articles of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) to which it had given further effect.10 Although it was not clear at the 
time, later in October 2007 the Lord Chancellor, in the consultation paper The Governance of 
Britain, announced plans for a British Bill of Rights and Duties describing the HRA as a „first, 
but substantial step towards a formal statement of rights‟.11 Part of this first step was to utilise 
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most of the procedural aspects of the ECHR at the national level. Later it became clear that 
British courts were also keen to utilise substantive Convention jurisprudence.  
Adopting a test which had been utilised at the international level for more than fifty years carried 
with it a number of advantages. It was cheap – particularly when compared to processes followed 
in Canada, South Africa, Northern Ireland and elsewhere when developing a domestic, home 
grown, bill of rights. It suited the theme, “rights brought home”. It was a model which was 
employed exclusively in a human rights context and was suited to that context given the test of 
proportionality often requiring individual victim consideration. And it assuaged government 
fears about floodgates being opened to a torrent of new test claims brought by public interest 
groups. However, from the outset there were concerns. 
The problems with transplanting a test for standing 
Errors in translation 
When a foreign body of law is directly transplanted to the national system, there is always the 
risk that there will be errors in translation. This is particularly evident in relation to the victim 
test where errors have been committed by judges but also the pool of would be claimants under 
the HRA. Knowledge problems with the HRA are well known. For example, in January 2008 the 
Ministry of Justice published the Human Rights Insight Project
12
 conducted by its previous 
incarnation, the Department for Constitutional Affairs (DCA), from December 2004 to May 
2006 to provide an evidence base for human rights policy development. There were a number of 
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 Ministry of Justice Research Series 1/08, January 2008 http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/human-rights-insight-
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key findings relating to the HRA. In particular, “the term „human rights‟ has mainly positive 
associations . . . but there is little understanding of the application of human rights / the HRA to 
normal life / public service delivery.” Absorbing more than fifty years of ECtHR jurisprudence 
concerning the meaning of “victim” is an obvious part of this and is reflected in the limited and 
conservative victim status of those claimants who bring proceedings. A full survey of 
Convention jurisprudence concerning the meaning of victim is beyond the boundaries of this 
paper but briefly, it is clear that the ECtHR, and the former Commission, have approached the 
test very liberally.  
The Court has commented on the importance of the test describing it as “one of the keystones in 
the machinery for the enforcement of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.”13 It 
applies the test in a liberal and flexible way, without excessive formalism
14
, noting that the 
“procedural provisions of the Convention must, in view of the fact that the Convention and its 
institutions were set up to protect the individual, be applied in a manner which serves to make 
the system of individual applications efficacious”.15 The Court also takes into account the merits 
of the application holding that it has discretion as regards “the granting of victim status when the 
complaint relates to an issue of general interest”.16 Such a situation has been held to arise in 
particular where an application concerns the legislation or a legal system or practice of the 
defendant state.
17
 In 2005 it stated: 
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Human rights cases before the Court generally also have a moral dimension, which it 
must take into account when considering whether to continue with the examination of an 
application after the applicant has ceased to exist. All the more so if the issues raised by 
the case transcend the person and the interests of the applicant . . . The Court has 
repeatedly stated that is judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought 
before it but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by 
the Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements 
undertaken by them as Contracting Parties. Although the primary purpose of the 
Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues 
on public-policy grounds in the common interests, thereby raising the general standards 
of protection of human rights and extending human rights jurisprudence throughout the 
community of Convention states.
18
 
Given the application of these principles, over time, in addition to the straightforward victim, 
who is able to demonstrate a “sufficiently direct link between the applicant and the harm which 
they consider they have sustained on account of the alleged violation”19, categories of other 
victim have developed. Most important, to the domestic context, are the categories of indirect 
victim and potential victim the examples of which before the Court are far broader than anything 
which has been considered in the domestic context.  
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Errors in translation have also affected the judicial approach to the s.7 test. One recent example 
is Lord Scott‟s observations in Savage20 that he was “unable to understand how a close family 
member can claim to be a „victim‟ in relation to an act, in breach of the article 2(1) negative 
obligation, or in relation to an omission, in breach of the article 2(1) positive obligation, that had 
led to the death.”21 His Lordship did not see it “as any part of the function of article 2(1) to add 
to the class of persons who under ordinary domestic law can seek financial compensation for a 
death an undefined, and perhaps undefinable, class composed of persons close to the deceased 
who have suffered distress and anguish on account of the death.”22 Whilst it was not a point 
dispositive of the action, his Lordship doubted the legitimacy of the claimant‟s prosecution of the 
action
23
, in this instance, a daughter claiming a breach of Art.2 in relation to the suicide of her 
mother who had absconded from Runwell Hospital where she was being treated as a detained 
patient. His Lordship‟s comments in this case are entirely inconsistent with the consistent case 
law of the Court on indirect victims where it has been held that individuals, who are the next-of-
kin of persons who have died in circumstances giving rise to issues under Article 2 of the 
Convention, may apply as applicants in their own right. “[T]his is a particular situation governed 
by the nature of the violation alleged and considerations of the effective implementation of one 
of the most fundamental provisions in the Convention system.”24  
                                                 
20
 Savage v South Essex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust [2008] UKHL 74 
21
 [5] 
22
 [5] 
23
 [5] 
24
 Biç v Turkey, Application no. 55955/00, 2 February 2006 at [22] 
This is also the position in relation to potential victims where both claimants and courts have not 
yet reached the limits set by the Strasbourg institutions. There are very few examples of potential 
victims bringing a claim under the HRA. The most high profile to date has been the case of 
Rusbridger
25
 where the House of Lords adjudicated in the proceedings brought by The Guardian 
for a declaration that s.3 of the Treason Act 1848, when read in light of the HRA, did not apply 
to persons who evinced in print or in writing an intent to depose the monarch or deprive her of 
her imperial status or to establish a republican form of government unless their intent was to 
achieve this by acts or force, constraint or other unlawful means. The Guardian had published 
articles which advocated republicanism and the editor sent a copy to the Attorney General. No 
prosecutions were brought, therefore it was questionable whether The Guardian had the requisite 
victim status under section 7 to bring the proceedings. A majority of the House of Lords held that 
this did not matter: 
The Guardian do not have to demonstrate that they are „victims‟ under s.7 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998. That much is conceded and, in any event, obvious on a proper view of 
the place of s.3 in the scheme of the Human Rights Act 1998.
26
 
Attention was drawn to the broad approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and 
the example given was Norris v. Ireland
27
 where a homosexual man complained that the 
criminalisation of homosexual conduct in Ireland violated his Article 8 right to respect for his 
private life, although he accepted that the risk of being prosecuted was remote. The Court 
accepted that he was a victim. Following this judgment, the majority in the House of Lords 
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concluded that “for present purposes it is sufficient that The Guardian has an interest and 
standing. That is the threshold requirement.”28 However, certain limits were also put in place. It 
was held that save in exceptional circumstances, it was not appropriate for a member of the 
public to bring proceedings against the Crown for a declaration that certain proposed conduct 
was lawful and name the Attorney General as the formal defendant to the claim. Whilst the 
majority held that the facts here were possibly within the exceptional category
29
 it concluded that 
the matter ought not to be heard again by the Administrative Court: 
The idea that s.3 could survive scrutiny under the Human Rights Act is unreal. The fears 
of the editor of The Guardian were more than a trifle alarmist. In my view the courts 
ought not to be troubled further with this unnecessary litigation.
30
  
Furthermore it was noted that sections 3 and 4 of the HRA are “intended to promote and protect 
human rights in a practical way, not to be an instrument by which the courts can chivvy 
Parliament into spring-cleaning the statute book, perhaps to the detriment of more important 
legislation. Such a spring-cleaning process might have some symbolic significance but I can see 
no other practical purpose which this litigation would achieve.”31 By contrast from very early on, 
the ECtHR has accepted that it is possible for an individual to be a victim, even if the law, policy 
or practice in question has not been applied to him or her, provided they run the risk of being 
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directly affected by it.
32
 Over the years, the concept of the potential victim has been deployed in 
a variety of contexts and often the pool of potential victims has been very wide. For example, in 
Norris v Ireland
33
 The applicant, an active homosexual, complained to the Court about the 
existence in Ireland of laws which made certain homosexual practices between consenting adult 
men criminal offences. In Open Door
34
 the Court concluded that all women of child bearing age 
in Ireland were potential victims of an injunction imposed by the Irish Courts on two companies 
set up to counsel pregnant women which restrained them from providing certain information to 
pregnant women concerning abortion facilities outside the jurisdiction of Ireland. In Burden and 
Burden v United Kingdom
35
 the Grand Chamber confirmed that the unmarried sisters who lived 
together and faced liability to inheritance tax if one of them died were potential victims as it was 
“open to a person to contend that a law violates his rights, in the absence of an individual 
measure of implementation, if he is required either to modify his conduct or risk being 
prosecuted . . or if he is a member of a class of people who risk being directly affected by the 
legislation”.36 
Not in keeping with domestic law - the remaining ban on representative standing 
Whilst the ECtHR is liberal in its interpretation of victim when it comes to individuals, the 
Commission and Court have been clear that an organisation can only be a victim and have 
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standing before the Court if its own rights have been affected. A recent example is Georgian 
Labour Party v Georgia
37
 where the Court held that the party, being a corporate entity, could not 
run for the presidential election and was not actually affected by the contested electoral 
mechanisms and results of the presidential election. “[T]he applicant‟s complaints about the 
electoral mechanisms of the presidential election rather express concern on behalf of the 
electorate at large and constitutes therefore a clear instance of actio popularis, the institution of 
which is not provided for under the Convention system”. However, it was possible for it to be a 
victim in relation to complaints that the repeat parliamentary election were incompatible with 
Art.3 of Protocol No.1, in particular the amendment to the voter registration system which 
resulted in the alleged disenfranchisement of two electoral districts. 
The limit on representational standing is different to the test of sufficient interest which allows 
for representational standing. For example, in 1988 the Child Poverty Action Group and the 
National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux argued that the Secretary of State for Social 
Services had wrongly interpreted sections of the Social Security Act 1975. Whilst locus standi 
was not argued, the Court of Appeal held that it was in no doubt that it had jurisdiction to hear 
the application and that if it had been an issue before them, it would have been granted.
38
 In 1993 
Greenpeace brought an application for judicial review of a decision by Her Majesty‟s 
Inspectorate of Pollution and the Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food to grant applications 
by British Nuclear Fuels for variations of authorisations under the Radioactive Substances Act 
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1960 to discharge radioactive waste from BNFL‟s premises at Sellafield.39 Taking into account 
the nature of the applicant, the extent of the applicant‟s interest in the issues raised, the remedy 
sought to be achieved and the nature of the relief sought, the Divisional Court concluded that 
Greenpeace had standing. Particular note was taken of the national and international standing of 
Greenpeace and its integrity. Also taken into consideration was the fact that if Greenpeace were 
denied standing, those they represented might not have an effective way to bring the issues 
before the court. “Consequently a less well-informed challenge might be mounted which would 
stretch unnecessarily the court‟s resources and which would not afford the court the assistance it 
requires in order to do justice between the parties.”  
Continuing the ban on representational standing practiced by the ECtHR in the domestic context 
has impacted negatively upon the effective legal protection of human rights. From the 
government‟s perspective, its effect has been costly. The absence of test claims has led to a 
proliferation of the same type of claim
40
. And it is obvious that many important cases have not 
been brought. Legislating in this way, not in keeping with the domestic model, has actually now 
resulted in further change to bring the HRA more into line the comparable judicial review model. 
As noted above, the Equality and Human Rights Commission may bring proceedings under the 
HRA. The Government amendment inserting what is now s.30 of the Equality Act 2006 was 
moved during the report debate in the House of Lords. Lord Falconer confirmed that the 
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amendments would provide the Commission “with an express power to rely on the convention 
rights in judicial reviews that it has instituted – or in which it intervenes – and disapplies the 
victim test to that end. However, paragraph (b) of new subsection (2A) requires that the 
commission may act only if there is or would be one or more victims of the unlawful act – the 
effect being that there should still be a victim as before, but that the commission may bring the 
case. This amendment will therefore not create any new opportunities for litigation under the 
Human Rights Act, or permit purely hypothetical cases to be brought. . . The amendment is not 
about making the commission a major litigating body in respect of human rights. Its role remains 
essentially promotional. . . granting the commission a limited power such as this allows it to 
bring strategic cases to clarify important points of law. In many such cases, the facts of the case 
will be agreed . . but the legal framework will be in dispute. It is more efficient and more cost 
effective for the commission to be able to seek a clear declaration on a point of law in such 
circumstances, instead of requiring a victim to bring a case in their own right and for the 
commission then to intervene.”41 Lord Falconer hoped that the commission would use its power 
wisely and strategically to “contribute to the continued development of the body of human rights 
jurisprudence produced by our domestic courts under the Human Rights Act.”42 
Conclusion 
Effectively transplanting a bill of rights from an international system to a domestic one carries 
with it obvious risks as well as benefits. The s.7 victim test is one element of the overall picture 
but clearly illustrates some of the problems which can ensue. To develop a domestic bill of 
rights, carefully and over a long period of time, would possibly avert many of these problems. 
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There would be fewer errors of translation as it would not be necessary to rapidly absorb a vast 
body of case law; and the process itself would provide knowledge and education. Any test for 
standing produced by such a process would likely be much more in keeping with what is 
accepted domestically for similar types of claim. 
